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When	   Shapes	   and	   Sounds	   Become	   Words:	   Indexicals	   and	   the	   Metaphysics	   of	  Semantic	  Tokens	  	  	   1. The	  Trouble	  with	  Indexicals	  	  Kaplan	   (1979)	  proposed	   that	   the	  meaning	  of	   indexicals	   like	   ‘I’,	   ‘here’	   and	   ‘now’	   is	  fixed	  by	  rules	  he	  called	  their	   ‘character’.	  When	  coupled	  with	  a	   ‘context’,	  which	  is	  a	  set	  of	  indices	  picking	  out	  an	  agent,	  time	  and	  place,	  the	  character	  identifies	  a	  ‘content’	  for	  an	  indexical,	  which	  is	  what	  the	  indexical	  refers	  to.	  The	  content	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  the	  agent	  at	   the	   context,	   the	   content	   of	   ‘here’	   is	   the	  place	  of	   the	   context,	   and	   the	   content	   of	  ‘now’	   is	   the	   time	  of	   the	   context.	  Kaplan	   then	  proposes	   that	   admissible	   or	   ‘proper’	  contexts	   are	   restricted	   to	   those	   in	  which	   the	   agent	   is	   at	   the	   time	  and	  place	  of	   the	  context.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  following	  string	  will	  always	  be	  true:	  	  	   1) I	  am	  here	  now	  	  Where	   indexicals	   are	   produced	   in	   token	   utterances,	   Kaplan’s	   schema	   is	   generally	  taken	  to	   imply	   that	   ‘I’	  will	   refer	   to	   the	  agent	   that	  produces	   the	   token,	   ‘here’	   to	   the	  place	  of	  production,	  and	  ‘now’	  to	  the	  time	  of	  production.	  This	  makes	  sense	  of	  many	  typical	  uses	  of	  indexicals.	  If	  Superman,	  standing	  on	  Krypton	  on	  the	  1st	  of	  April	  1938	  says	  ‘I’m	  here	  now’,	  the	  token	  ‘I’	  picks	  out	  Superman,	  ‘here’	  picks	  out	  Krypton,	  and	  ‘now’	  picks	  out	  the	  1st	  of	  April	  1938	  –	  the	  producer,	  place	  of	  production,	  and	  time	  of	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production.	  However,	  many	  other	   cases	  where	   indexicals	  are	  produced	  have	  been	  identified	  that	  do	  not	  follow	  this	  pattern.	  One	  can,	  for	  example,	  record	  the	  following	  message	  on	  an	  answering	  machine:	  	  	   2) I	  am	  not	  here	  now	  	  When	  this	  message	  is	  played	  back	  to	  a	  caller,	  the	  token	  ‘now’	  appears	  to	  refer	  not	  to	  the	   time	   the	   token	   is	  produced	  by	   the	  agent,	  but	   to	   the	   time	  when	   the	  message	   is	  played	   back	   (Sidelle	   1991).	   Similarly,	   recall	   the	   tour-­‐guide	   in	   Jurassic	   Park,	   who	  conducts	  his	   tour	  remotely.	  His	  voice	   is	  projected	  over	  a	   loudspeaker	  on	   the	   tour-­‐bus,	   while	   he	   remains	   safe	   in	   a	   central	   office.	   As	   the	   tour-­‐bus	   is	   passing	   the	  Tyrannosaurus	  Rex	  enclosure,	  he	  can	  say:	  	  	   3) Here	  you	  can	  see	  T-­‐Rex	  	  	  But	   in	   this	  case	   the	  token	   ‘here’	  refers	  not	   to	   the	   location	  of	   the	  tour-­‐guide,	  but	   to	  the	   location	   of	   the	   bus	   where	   his	   voice	   is	   broadcast.	   Again,	   the	   location	   of	  production	  is	  not	  the	  location	  picked	  out	  by	  ‘here’.	  	   As	  a	  result	  of	  cases	  like	  these,	  many	  have	  argued	  that	  a	  speaker’s	  intentions	  must	  play	  a	  role	  in	  deciding	  the	  meaning	  a	  token	  indexical	  has.	  It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	   intentions	   fix,	   from	   one	   case	   to	   the	   next,	   either	   the	   character	   that	   governs	   a	  token	  indexical	  (Smith	  1989);	  the	  context	  in	  which	  a	  token	  indexical	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	   evaluated	   (Predelli	   1998,	   2002,	   2008,	   Akerman	   2009);	   or	   the	   content	   of	   a	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demonstrative	   component	   that	  may	   belong	   to	   indexicals,	   supposing	   ‘I’,	   ‘here’	   and	  ‘now’	   are	   equivalent	   to	   ‘this	   person’,	   ‘this	   place’	   and	   ‘this	   time’	   (Krasner	   2006,	  Mount	   2009,	   Recanati	   2001,	   20101).	   According	   to	   these	   views,	   the	   reference	   of	   a	  token	   indexical	   is	   determined	   by	   its	   producer’s	   intentions,	   and	   not	   just	   who	  produces	   it	   or	   when.	   This	   allows	   that	   a	   token	   of	   ‘now’	   can	   refer	   to	   the	   time	   of	  playback	   of	   an	   answering	  machine	  message,	   for	   example,	   just	   in	   case	   the	   person	  who	   records	   the	   token	   intends	   either	   the	   character,	   context	   of	   interpretation,	   or	  demonstrative	   content	   of	   the	   indexical	   to	   deliver	   the	   time	   of	   hearing	   as	   the	  reference	  of	  the	  token,	  and	  similarly	  for	  the	  Jurassic	  Park	  and	  other	  cases.	  The	  difficulty	   faced	  by	   the	   intentionalist	   strategy	   is	   that	   it	  makes	   it	  hard	   to	  explain	   how	   uses	   of	   indexicals	   are	   easily	   understood.	   We	   have	   no	   trouble	  understanding	  utterances	  of	  1),	  2)	  or	  3).	  But	  if	  a	  producer’s	  intentions	  can	  adjust	  the	  character,	   context	   or	   content	   of	   a	   token	   indexical	   so	   that	   it	   picks	   out	   whatever	  person,	   place	   or	   time	   they	   like,	   then	   it	   is	   unclear	   how	   hearers	   confidently	   know	  what	  uses	  of	   these	   indexicals	  refer	   to.	   If	  nothing	  stops	  a	  speaker	   from	   intending	  a	  token	  of	  ‘now’	  she	  records	  into	  her	  answering	  machine	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  thousand	  years	  past,	   why	   is	   it	   that	   hearers	   always	   know	   that	   the	   token	   picks	   out	   the	   time	   of	  hearing?	  And	  if	  nothing	  stops	  the	  tour-­‐guide	  in	  the	  case	  above	  from	  intending	  ‘here’	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  moon,	  why	  does	  his	  audience	  immediately	  know	  which	  location	  he	  is	  referring	  to?	  This	  has	  become	  the	  standard	  objection	  to	  the	  intentionalist	  approach.	  	   To	  avoid	  this	  problem,	  others	  argue	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	   indexicals	  must	  be	  constrained	  by	  conventional	  rules	  to	  a	  greater	  degree	  than	  the	  intentionalist	  allows.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Recanati	  endorses	  this	  approach	  for	  ‘here’	  and	  ‘now’	  only.	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Some	  of	  these	  proposals	  appeal	  to	  multiple	  rules,	  and	  hold	  that	  the	  rule	  that	  applies	  is	  determined	  not	  by	  a	  producer’s	  intentions,	  but	  by	  non-­‐intentional	  features	  of	  the	  context	  (Corazza	  et	  al	  2002,	  Gorvette	  2005,	  Parsons	  2011,	  Michaelson	  2013).	  On	  an	  answering-­‐machine,	  the	  rule	  will	  fix	  the	  time	  of	  hearing	  as	  the	  time	  picked	  out	  by	  a	  token	  of	  ‘now’,	  but	  in	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  discourse,	  the	  rule	  fixes	  the	  time	  of	  speaking.	  But	  this	   view	   has	   implausible	   implications	   too.	   If	   indexicals	   were	   governed	   by	   many	  rules,	  they	  should	  be	  hard	  for	  users	  to	  learn,	  and	  to	  use,	  and	  yet	  they	  don’t	  seem	  to	  be	   (Predelli	   2002:	   313,	   Corazza	   2004:	   306).	   The	   multiple-­‐rule	   approach	   also	  suggests	   that	   indexicals	   are	   ambiguous,	   something	   that	   we	   have	   independent	  reasons	  to	  doubt	  (Cohen	  and	  Michaelson,	  2013:	  585).	  	  What	  would	  avoid	  all	  of	  these	  problems,	  of	  course,	  is	  an	  account	  that	  explains	  our	  various	  uses	  of	  indexicals	  by	  assigning	  just	  one	  rule	  to	  each	  indexical	  type,	  but	  without	  requiring	  speaker	  intentions	  to	  arbitrate	  on	  what	  counts	  as	  the	  context	  or	  content	  from	  one	  token	  to	  the	  next.	  Cohen	  (2013)	  has	  recently	  argued	  that	  we	  can	  accomplish	  exactly	  this.	  What	  is	  required	  is	  what	  Cohen	  calls	  a	  ‘token-­‐contextualist’	  interpretation	   of	   Kaplan’s	   model,	   a	   proposal	   he	   attributes	   originally	   to	   Sidelle	  (1991).	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  content	  of	  ‘I’,	  ‘here’,	  or	  ‘now’	  is	  not	  the	  agent,	  place	  or	  time	  in	  the	  context	  of	  production,	  but	  the	  agent,	  place,	  or	  time	  in	  the	  context	  of	  tokening2.	  Importantly,	   for	   typical	   uses	   of	   indexicals,	  where	   the	   producer,	   place	   and	   time	   of	  production	  is	  referred	  to	  with	  ‘I’,	   ‘here’	  and	  ‘now’,	  this	  model	  will	  deliver	  the	  same	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Cohen	   in	   fact	   thinks	   ‘I’	  always	  refers	  to	   its	  producer,	  while	   ‘now’	  and	   ‘here’	  pick	  out	  the	  time	  and	  place	  of	  tokening.	  This	  can	  be	  interpreted	  to	  mean	  that	  the	  context	  for	  ‘I’	  is	  the	  context	  of	  production	  but	  the	  context	  for	  ‘here’	  and	  ‘now’	  is	  the	  context	  of	  tokening,	  which	  some	  find	  inelegant	  (Michaelson	  2011:	   fn15).	   However	   if	   we	   assume	   that	   the	   agent	   of	   a	   context	   of	   tokening	   just	   is	   the	   original	  producer	  of	   the	   token,	   then	  we	  can	  eliminate	   the	   inelegance	  so	   that	  all	  variables	  are	   fixed	  by	   facts	  about	  the	  context	  of	  tokening	  (Cohen	  2013:	  7).	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results	   as	   the	   production-­‐contextual	   model,	   since	   in	   such	   cases	   the	   context	   of	  tokening	  will	  be	  the	  same	  as	  the	  context	  of	  production.	  But	  the	  account	  promises	  to	  deal	  with	   the	   atypical	   cases	   considered	   too.	   The	   token	   ‘now’	   in	   a	  message	   played	  back	  by	   an	   answering-­‐machine	   refers	   to	   the	   time	   the	  message	   is	  played	  back,	   not	  produced	   –	   and	   the	   token-­‐contextual	   account	   predicts	   this,	   since	   the	   time	   of	  playback	  is	  the	  time	  of	  tokening	  (the	  time	  the	  token	  occurs).	  And	  the	  token	  ‘here’	  in	  the	  tour-­‐guide’s	  message	  in	  Jurassic	  Park	  refers	  not	  to	  the	  location	  of	  production	  of	  the	  message	  but	  to	  the	  location	  of	  tokening	  (the	  place	  the	  token	  occurs),	  which	  is	  on	  the	  tour-­‐bus.	  	  	   Since	   it	   avoids	   the	   difficulties	   faced	   by	   more	   elaborate	   approaches,	   this	  account	   is	  well	   worth	   pursuing.	   However,	   there	   is	   a	   set	   of	   problem	   cases	   for	   the	  account	  that	  are	  largely	  unexplored,	  and	  which	  threaten	  to	  entirely	  upend	  the	  view.	  	  	   2. Travelling	  tokens,	  Stray	  tokens,	  Extra	  tokens	  	  Difficulties	   arise	   for	   the	   token-­‐contextual	   view	  when	   tokens	   occur	   in	   places	   or	   at	  times	  that	  they	  don’t	  seem	  to	  refer	  to.	  Cases	  already	  discussed	  include	  the	  following.	  Suppose	  I	  inscribe	  a	  note	  on	  a	  post-­‐card	  –	  ‘I	  wish	  you	  were	  here’	  –	  and	  send	  it	  from	  Tahiti	  to	  Ireland.	  We	  use	  the	  token	  ‘here’	  in	  such	  cases	  to	  refer	  to	  Tahiti.	  And	  yet	  the	  token	  ends	  up,	  and	  is	  read,	  in	  Ireland.	  The	  token-­‐contextual	  view	  seems	  to	  imply,	  as	  a	  result,	  that	  ‘here’	  refers	  to	  Ireland	  (Michaelson	  2013:	  17).	  Cohen	  (2013:	  24)	  argues	  that	   such	   cases	  may	  be	  understood	  anaphorically,	  where	   the	   reference	  of	   ‘here’	   is	  anaphorically	  fixed	  by	  a	  location	  specified	  elsewhere	  on	  the	  post-­‐card	  (such	  as	  the	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post-­‐mark).	  It	  is	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  details	  underpinning	  this	  kind	  of	  anaphora	  are	   not	   clearly	   understood,	   but	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   argument	   let’s	   suppose	   that’s	   a	  possible	  solution.	  Even	  if	  we	  allow	  it,	  however,	  there	  are	  more	  serious	  problems.	  	  Consider	   a	   case	   discussed	   by	   Predelli	   (1998).	   A	   note	   is	   written	   in	   the	  morning	  by	  Jones	  for	  his	  wife,	  who	  he	  expects	  to	  return	  to	  the	  house	  at	  4pm.	  Jones	  writes	  ‘As	  you	  can	  see,	  I’m	  not	  here	  now’	  on	  the	  note.	  However,	  his	  wife	  returns	  at	  10pm,	  and	  reads	   the	  note	   then.	  The	   token-­‐contextual	  account	  seems	   to	   imply	   that	  the	   indexical	   picks	   out	   10pm,	   when	   it	   is	   read	   –	   and	   yet	   Predelli’s	   reasonable	  intuition	  is	  that	  Jones’	  wife	  misunderstands	  the	  note	  if	  she	  takes	  it	  to	  refer	  to	  10pm.	  	  Cohen	  replies	  to	  this	  case	  by	  simply	  rejecting	  Predelli’s	  intuition,	  and	  insisting	  that	  the	  token	  does	  indeed	  refer	  to	  10pm.	  I	  don’t	  find	  this	  convincing,	  particularly	  in	  light	  of	  the	  following	  analogous	  case.	  Suppose	  a	  restaurant	  manager	  places	  a	  sign	  inside	  the	  door	  of	  her	  restaurant	  reading	  ‘Please	  wait	  here	  to	  be	  seated’.	  The	  sign	  seems	  to	  refer	   to	   its	   location	   –	   just	   as	   the	   token-­‐contextual	   account	   predicts.	   But	   consider	  what	   happens	   if	   the	   sign	   is	   thoughtlessly	   moved	   by	   a	   cleaner	   from	   its	   current	  position	   to	   a	   broom	   closet	   at	   the	   rear	   of	   the	   building.	   A	   customer	   looking	   for	   the	  restroom	  now	  sees	  the	  sign	  through	  the	  open	  closet	  door.	  Just	  as	  in	  Predelli’s	  case,	  where	  the	  note	  is	  read	  at	  a	  time	  other	  than	  that	  intended,	  in	  this	  case	  the	  sign	  is	  read	  in	   a	  place	  other	   than	   that	   intended.	   Since	  Cohen	   is	   committed	   that	  Predelli’s	   note	  refers	  to	  the	  time	  it	  is	  read,	  he	  should	  be	  committed	  in	  this	  case	  that	  customers	  have	  been	  asked	  to	  wait	  in	  the	  broom	  closet.	  That	  this	  is	  doubtful	  is	  even	  clearer	  when	  we	  think	   about	   where	   the	   sign	   in	   the	   restaurant	   came	   from	   in	   the	   first	   place.	  Presumably,	   somewhere	   in	   the	  world	   there	   is	   a	   factory	   that	  makes	   these	   signs.	   In	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the	   corner	   of	   the	   factory,	   a	   stack	   of	   ‘Please	   wait	   here’	   signs	   sits	   ready	   to	   be	  dispatched	  to	  restaurants.	  Do	  the	  signs	  in	  the	  stack	  form	  a	  chorus	  inviting	  people	  to	  wait	  next	  to	  them?	  Cohen’s	  position	  seems	  to	  commit	  him	  to	  the	  implausible	  claim	  that	  they	  do.	  We	  could	  call	  such	  cases	  ‘stray	  tokens’,	  which	  either	  end	  up	  or	  start	  out	  where	  nobody	  intended	  them	  to	  be.	  	   And	  the	  difficulties	  don’t	  end	  there.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  pervasive	  problem	  for	  a	  token-­‐contextual	  account	  is	  what	  we	  could	  call	   ‘extra	  tokens’.	  When	  my	  message	  ‘I’m	   not	   here	   now’	   is	   played	   back	   to	   someone	  whose	   call	   I	   miss,	   the	   token	   ‘now’	  refers	  to	  the	  time	  of	  tokening.	  But	  there	  is	  another	  apparent	  token	  in	  this	  case	  that	  the	  token-­‐contextualist	  does	  not	  explain.	  When	  I	  originally	  record	  the	  message	  into	  my	  answering-­‐machine,	   I	  produce	  an	  apparent	  token	  of	   the	  sentence	   ‘I’m	  not	  here	  now’.	  The	  token-­‐contextual	  account	  seems	  to	  imply	  that	  in	  this	  event,	  I	  refer	  to	  the	  time	  at	  which	  I	  speak.	  The	  account	  threatens,	  as	  a	  result,	  to	  make	  all	  answer-­‐phone	  users	  liars.	  The	  same	  problem	  arises	  for	  the	  tour-­‐guide:	  although	  the	  sentence	  ‘here	  you	  will	  see	  T-­‐Rex’	   is	  tokened	  on	  the	  tour-­‐bus,	  another	  apparent	  token	  of	  the	  sentence	  occurs	  in	  the	  office	  where	  the	  tour-­‐guide	  speaks.	  Does	  he	  lie	  and	  tell	  the	  truth	  at	  the	  same	  time?	  Or	  consider	  an	  ordinary	  telephone	  conversation.	  If	  I	  phone	  you	  in	  Alaska	  and	  say	  ‘I’m	  here	  now’	  while	  speaking	  in	  Paris,	  one	  apparent	  token	  of	  ‘here’	  occurs	  where	   I	  am,	  and	  another	   is	  produced	   in	  Alaska,	   for	  you	  to	  hear.	  Do	   I	  refer	   to	  both	  locations	  simultaneously,	  and	  contradict	  myself?	  Finally,	  in	  a	  particularly	  perplexing	  case,	  consider	  a	  billboard	  at	  the	  side	  of	  a	  motorway	  that	  reads	  ‘You	  are	  now	  entering	  beautiful	  Poughkeepsie’	  (cf.	  Egan	  2009).	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If	  we	  suppose	  a	  temporal	  indexical	  tokens	  at	  a	  time,	  and	  that	  the	  inscription	  on	  the	  billboard	   tokens	   when	   it	   is	   read	   by	   passing	   drivers,	   then	   the	   token-­‐contextual	  account	  predicts,	  rightly,	  that	  the	  inscription	  refers	  to	  those	  occasions	  on	  which	  it	  is	  passed.	  But	  what	  about	  the	  occasions	  when	  the	  sign	  is	  not	  being	  passed?	  The	  token-­‐contextual	   account	   does	   nothing	   to	   rule	   out	   those	   occasions,	   and	   so	   implies	   that	  what	  the	  sign	  displays	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  time	  is	  at	  best	  nonsense,	  and	  at	  worst	  a	  lie.	  This	  seems	  like	  another	  bizarre	  outcome	  for	  the	  token-­‐contextual	  view.	  	   Can	  the	  token-­‐contextualist	  deal	  with	  these	  cases?	  As	  I	  argue	  next,	  she	  can,	  by	  appealing	   to	   speaker	   intentions.	   However,	   by	   making	   the	   appeal	   to	   speaker-­‐intentions	  at	   the	   level	  of	   the	  metaphysics	  of	   tokens	  rather	   than	   in	  order	   to	  decide	  their	   meaning,	   this	   can	   be	   done	   without	   reintroducing	   the	   difficulties	   associated	  with	  intentionalist	  approaches	  that	  the	  conventionalist	  hopes	  to	  avoid.	  	  	   3. A	  Minimally	  Intentionalist	  Metaphysics	  for	  Semantic	  Tokens	  	  Nobody	   should	   believe	   that	   intentions	   have	   no	   role	   at	   all	   to	   play	   in	   a	   semantic	  theory.	   Intentions,	  after	  all,	   are	  required	   to	   turn	  a	  shape	  or	  sound	   into	  a	  semantic	  token	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Suppose	  a	  rock	  trapped	  in	  a	  glacier	  slowly	  carves	  the	  shape	  ‘I’m	  not	  here	  now’	   into	  a	  wall	  of	  granite	   it	  passes	  over	   (Millikan	  2012:	  221).	  Does	  anyone	  think	  that	  the	  rock	  tells	  a	  lie?	  Hopefully	  not:	  the	  rock	  is	  obviously	  incapable	  of	   saying	   anything.	   Although	   an	   inscription	   of	   the	   shape	   ‘I’m	   not	   here	   now’	   can	  under	  some	  circumstances	  mean	  I’m	  not	  here	  now,	  what	  is	  at	  least	  required	  for	  this	  to	  happen	   is	   that	   some	  agent	   intends	   it	   to	  express	   this	  meaning.	  This	   is	   simply	   to	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restate	   the	   point	   made	   by	   Grice	   (1957)	   that	   isolates	   the	   class	   of	   linguistically	  meaningful	   events	   from	   everything	   else	   (including	   scratches	   made	   by	   glaciers,	  shapes	   in	   the	   clouds,	   and	   noises	   made	   by	   cats	   that	   sound	   like	   ‘hello’).	   Although	  Grice’s	   full	   conditions	   for	   a	   shape	   or	   sound	   to	   count	   as	   an	   utterance	   are	   often	  considered	   too	   strong,	   this	   minimal	   component	   of	   his	   view	   is	   widely	   endorsed	  (Searle	   1969,	   Kaplan	   1990,	   Richard	   1990,	   Davis	   2003,	   Recanati	   2010,	   Millikan	  2012).	   We	   could	   call	   this	   view	   ‘minimal	   intentionalism’,	   which	   holds	   that	   some	  morphological	  token	  φ	  (a	  token	  shape	  or	  sound)	  is	  a	  semantic	  token	  (an	  utterance)	  with	  the	  meaning	  p	  only	  if	  it	  is	  intended	  by	  its	  user3	  S	  to	  express	  p:	  	  MI:	   φ	  is	  a	  semantic	  token	  meaning	  p	  → S intends that φ expresses p 	  To	   distinguish	   utterances	   of	   ‘hello’	   from	   the	   cat’s	   miao,	   it	   would	   seem	   that	   any	  theory	   of	   meaning	   needs	   to	   endorse	   something	   like	   MI.	   Crucially,	   however,	   the	  appeal	   to	   intentions	   in	   MI	   is	   very	   different	   to	   that	   made	   on	   the	   more	   liberal	  intentionalist	   accounts	   considered	   above,	   on	   which	   a	   speaker’s	   intentions	   can	  arbitrate	  between	  multiple	  possible	  referents	  a	  token	  indexical	  can	  have.	  This	  is	  the	  result	   the	   conventionalist	   wants	   to	   block,	   and	   replace	   with	   a	   semantic	   rule	   that	  determines	   just	  one	  possible	  referent	   for	  any	   token	   indexical,	   thus	  minimizing	   the	  interpretation	  work	  demanded	  of	  hearers.	  But	  the	  conventionalist	  can	  do	  this	  while	  still	  endorsing	  MI.	  Even	  if	  the	  only	  reference	  a	  token	  of	  ‘here’	  can	  have	  is	  its	  location	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   I	   say	   ‘user’	   rather	   than	   the	  more	   common	   ‘producer’	  here	  because,	   as	  we	   shall	   see,	   the	  user	  of	   a	  morphological	  token	  needn’t	  always	  be	  its	  producer.	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of	  tokening,	  for	  example,	  it	  can	  still	  be	  the	  case	  that	  for	  a	  morphological	  token	  to	  be	  a	  token	  indexical	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  it	  must	  be	  intended	  to	  be	  by	  its	  user.	  	  In	  spite	  of	  its	  modesty,	  however,	  MI	  has	  quite	  far-­‐reaching	  consequences	  for	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  token	  utterances,	  which	  can	  be	  invoked	  to	  resolve	  the	  problems	  raised	   here	   for	   token-­‐contextualism.	   First	   consider	   the	   ‘extra-­‐tokens’	   problem.	   In	  the	   production	   of	   an	   answering	   machine	   message,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   sounds	  produced	  by	  the	  answering	  machine	  when	  someone	  calls,	  the	  recorder	  produces	  the	  sound	   ‘I’m	  not	  here	  now’	   in	  recording	   the	  message	  –	  and	   this	  creates	  an	  apparent	  problem	  for	  the	  token-­‐contextualist.	  But	  MI	  eliminates	  the	  problem.	  If	  the	  producer	  doesn’t	   intend	   the	  noise	   that	  comes	  out	  of	  her	  mouth	  at	   the	   time	  of	   recording	   the	  message	   to	   express	   the	   proposition	   I’m	   not	   here	   now,	   but	   intends	   only	   the	   sound	  subsequently	  produced	  by	  the	  answering	  machine	  to	  express	   that	  proposition,	   the	  sound	  initially	  produced	  is	  not	  a	  semantic	  token	  at	  all	  –	  it’s	  just	  a	  noise.	  Note	  again	  that	   speaker	   intentions	  are	  not	   arbitrating	  here	  between	  many	  possible	  meanings	  for	   a	   given	   semantic	   token,	   as	   they	   are	   on	   more	   liberal	   intentionalist	   accounts.	  Instead,	   they	   are	   invoked	   to	   decide,	   for	   a	   given	   morphological	   token,	   whether	   it	  counts	  as	  a	  semantic	  token	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	   MI	   similarly	   resolves	   the	   tour-­‐guide	   problem.	   The	   tour-­‐guide	   causes	   two	  morphological	   tokens	   to	   be	  produced	   –	   one	   in	   the	   tour-­‐bus,	   and	  one	   in	   his	   office,	  which	  raises	  a	  problem	  for	  the	  token-­‐contextualist.	  But	  if	  the	  guide	  does	  not	  intend	  the	  sound	  he	  makes	  in	  his	  office	  to	  express	  any	  meaning,	  but	  rather	  intends	  only	  the	  sound	  on	  the	  bus	  to,	  then	  we	  can	  again	  rule	  out	  the	  former	  as	  a	  non-­‐utterance.	  And	  this	  resolves	  the	  puzzle	  raised	  by	  the	  telephone	  call	  too.	  The	  sound	  ‘here’	  I	  produce	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in	  Paris	   is	   intended	  to	  have	  semantic	  content	  by	  its	  user,	  me,	  and	  according	  to	  the	  token-­‐contextual	   account,	   it	   picks	   out	   Paris.	   But	   if	   the	   sound	   produced	   by	   the	  telephone	  in	  Alaska	  is	  not	  intended	  by	  me	  to	  express	  anything,	  then	  according	  to	  MI	  it	  simply	  doesn’t	  count	  as	  a	  semantic	  token.4	  The	  first	  advantage	  of	  MI,	  then,	  is	  that	  it	  resolves	  the	  extra-­‐tokens	  problem.	  	   The	  consequences	  of	  MI	  reach	  farther	  still,	  however.	  Note	  that	  morphological	  tokens	   exist	   at	   particular	   places	   and	   times.	   If	   user-­‐intentions	   are	   required	   for	  morphological	   tokens	   to	   count	   as	   semantic	   tokens,	   these	   intentions	   must	   be	  directed	   at	   shapes	   and	   sounds	   in	   particular	   places,	   and	   at	   particular	   times.	   The	  consequence	   of	   this	   is	   that	   morphological	   tokens	   can	   change	   from	   being	   mere	  shapes	  and	  sounds	  to	  being	  semantic	  tokens,	  and	  back	  again.	  To	  see	  how	  this	  works,	  suppose	  I	  inscribe	  ‘this	  is	  a	  wall’	  on	  a	  post-­‐it	  note,	  and	  then	  affix	  the	  note	  to	  the	  wall.	  Once	  the	  note	  is	  affixed	  to	  the	  wall,	  it	  seems	  I	  have	  said	  something	  true.	  But	  before	  I	  stick	  the	  note	  to	  the	  wall,	  we	  are	  not	  tempted	  to	  think	  that	  I	  have	  lied	  –	  even	  if	  the	  note	   starts	   out	   on	   the	   table.	   Why	   not?	   The	   reason	   is	   that	   the	   inscription	   only	  becomes	  a	  semantic	  token	  when	  I	  stick	  it	  to	  the	  wall,	  since	  it	  is	  only	  while	  it	  is	  on	  the	  wall	  that	  I	  intend	  it	  to	  express	  anything.	  Equally,	  I	  am	  not	  made	  a	  liar	  if	  the	  note	  later	  falls	   off	   the	   wall	   and	   lands	   on	   the	   floor	   –	   because	   my	   intention	   is	   only	   for	   this	  inscription	  to	  express	  something	  when	  it	  is	  fixed	  to	  the	  wall.	  Outside	  of	  the	  time	  and	  place	  at	  which	  it	  is	  intended	  by	  me	  to	  express	  something,	  it	  loses	  its	  semantic	  token-­‐hood.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  This	  might	  sound	  surprising,	  since	  by	  listening	  to	  the	  sound	  produced	  in	  Alaska,	  you	  can	  know	  what	  I	  have	  said.	  However,	  note	  that	  if	  the	  sound	  in	  Alaska	  is	  morphologically	  type-­‐identical	  to	  the	  sound	  in	  Paris	  (they	  sound	  the	  same),	   it	  can	  allow	  you	  to	  know	  what	  I	  have	  said	  by	  allowing	  you	  to	  know	  what	  the	  token	  I	  have	  produced	  in	  Paris	  sounds	  like.	  It	  needn’t	  itself,	  as	  a	  result,	  be	  a	  semantic	  token.	  	  
	   12	  
This	  consequence	  of	  MI	  resolves	  the	  stray-­‐tokens	  problem.	  In	  Predelli’s	  case,	  Jones	  writes	  the	  note	  in	  the	  morning,	  expecting	  it	  to	  be	  read	  at	  4pm,	  but	  it	  isn’t	  read	  until	  10pm.	  Cohen	  bites	  the	  bullet	  and	  concludes	  that	  the	  indexical	  in	  the	  note	  picks	  out	  10pm.	  But	  it	  follows	  from	  MI	  that	  this	  is	  not	  necessary.	  If	  Jones	  only	  intends	  the	  inscription	  on	  the	  paper	  to	  count	  as	  an	  utterance	  at	  4pm,	  then	  MI	  entails	  that	  it	  only	  counts	   as	   an	   utterance	   at	   that	   time.	   On	   this	   view,	   the	   indexical	   ‘tokens’	   at	   4pm	   -­‐	  when	  it	  is	  intended	  to.	  But	  it	  does	  not	  token	  at	  the	  time	  Jones	  writes	  the	  note	  (which	  would	  make	  him	  a	  liar	  as	  he	  writes);	  and	  if	  Jones	  intends	  it	  only	  to	  token	  at	  4pm	  it	  will	   cease	   to	   be	   a	   semantic	   token	   after	   4pm,	   when	   the	   inscription	   will	   return	   to	  being	  simply	  a	  shape.	  We	  can	  therefore	  maintain	  the	  token-­‐contextual	  view	  without	  abandoning	   Predelli’s	   reasonable	   intuitions	   about	   this	   case:	   the	   token	   indexical	  picks	  out	  4pm,	  which	  is	  the	  only	  time	  at	  which	  it	  is	  a	  token	  indexical.	  All	  this	  follows	  from	  MI.	  	   That	  shapes	  and	  sounds	  can	  transition	  in	  and	  out	  of	  being	  utterances	  is	  made	  even	   clearer	  when	  we	   revisit	   the	   case	   of	   the	   ‘Please	  wait	   here’	   sign.	   The	   stack	   of	  signs	  in	  the	  factory	  easily	  fails	  MI,	  since	  here	  the	  signs	  are	  not	  intended	  by	  anyone	  to	  express	   anything.	   Their	   producers,	   the	   factory	  workers,	   are	  making	   the	   signs	   not	  with	  the	  intention	  that	  the	  signs	  express	  something,	  but	  that	  they	  display	  particular	  shapes.	  But	  now	  consider	  what	  happens	  when	  the	  signs	  are	  bought	  by	  restaurateurs	  and	  positioned	  intentionally	  inside	  the	  doors	  of	  their	  establishments.	  What	  was	  just	  a	   shape	  on	   a	   piece	   of	  metal	   becomes	   a	   semantic	   token,	   because	  now	   the	   shape	   is	  used	  with	  the	  intention	  that	  it	  express	  a	  particular	  meaning.5	  And	  this	  resolves	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  As	  a	  result,	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  producer	  of	  the	  sign	  is	  not	  its	  user	  –	  see	  fn.	  2.	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puzzle	  that	  arises	  when	  the	  sign	  is	  moved	  to	  the	  closet	  by	  the	  cleaner.	  In	  this	  case,	  customers	   are	  not	   in	   fact	   invited	   to	  wait	   in	   this	   absurd	   location.	  Rather,	   since	   the	  manager	  who	  originally	  places	  the	  sign	  intends	  it	  to	  express	  ‘Please	  wait	  here’	  only	  when	   it	   is	   at	   the	   location	   at	  which	   she	   places	   it,	   it	   ceases	   to	   be	   a	   semantic	   token	  when	  it	  is	  removed	  from	  that	  position	  and	  unthinkingly	  placed	  somewhere	  else.	  And	  of	  course	  it	  can	  become	  a	  semantic	  token	  again,	   if	   it	   is	  repositioned	  anew	  with	  the	  intention	  that	  it	  express	  this	  proposition	  once	  again.	  	   The	  most	   delicate	   consequence	   of	  MI	   is	   found	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   billboard	  reading	   ‘You	   are	   Now	   Entering	   Beautiful	   Poughkeepsie’.	   If	   the	   token-­‐contextual	  account	  is	  right,	  the	  token	  ‘now’	  on	  the	  sign	  refers	  to	  the	  time	  or	  times	  at	  which	  it	  tokens.	  We	  want	  those	  occasions	  to	  be	  those	  on	  which	  drivers	  pass	  the	  sign	  –	  and	  not	   the	   indefinitely	  many	  occasions	  on	  which	  no	  one	   is	  passing.	  But	  again,	  MI	  can	  rule	   out	   those	   occasions.	   Since	   the	   person	  who	   erects	   the	   sign	   only	   intends	   it	   to	  express	  the	  proposition	  in	  question	  when	  it	  is	  seen	  by	  a	  passing	  driver,	  this	  means	  that	  what	  hangs	  indefinitely	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  motorway	  is	  not	  a	  semantic	  token	  at	  all.	   Rather,	   what	   hangs	   there	   indefinitely	   is	   simply	   a	   shape,	   which	   becomes	   a	  semantic	  token	  only	  on	  those	  occasions	  that	  it	  is	  passed	  by	  a	  driver.	  	  	   To	   all	   of	   this,	   it	   might	   be	   objected	   that	   although	   I	   have	   insisted	   that	   this	  appeal	   to	   intentions	   does	   not	   introduce	   the	   problems	   for	   interpretation	   of	   earlier	  accounts,	  it	  introduces	  difficulties	  of	  interpretation	  of	  its	  own.	  For	  example,	  a	  hearer	  will	   have	   to	   decide	   which	   morphological	   tokens	   are	   utterances,	   and	   which	   are	  simply	  sounds	  and	  shapes	  –	  the	  noise	  made	  in	  recording	  an	  answer-­‐phone	  message,	  or	   the	   noise	   made	   at	   playback.	   That	   is	   true,	   although	   the	   decision	   will	   often	   be	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relatively	  easy.	  In	  the	  answer-­‐phone	  case,	  if	  we	  assume	  the	  message-­‐leaver	  is	  honest	  and	  sane,	  only	  the	  sound	  at	  playback	  could	  be	  intended	  to	  express	  the	  proposition	  ‘I’m	  not	  here	  now’,	  and	  hence	  only	  that	  sound	  could	  count	  as	  a	  semantic	  token.	  But	  no	   matter	   how	   hard	   it	   is	   to	   decide	   which	   are	   the	   semantic	   tokens,	   the	   current	  account	   will	   still	   leave	   interpreters	   with	   less	   work	   to	   do	   than	   more	   liberal	  intentionalist	   accounts.	   On	   this	   account,	   once	   it	   is	   decided	   which	   are	   the	   token	  indexicals,	   there	   is	   only	   one	   possible	   referent	   for	   each,	  while	   on	   the	  more	   liberal	  intentionalist	  accounts	  there	  still	  remain	  many.	  	  	   As	   we	   can	   see,	   the	  metaphysics	   of	   semantic	   tokens	   is	   thus	   quite	   complex,	  allowing	  shapes	  and	  sounds	  to	  transition	  in	  and	  out	  of	  being	  semantic	  tokens,	  even	  assuming	  no	  more	  than	  the	  modest	  criterion	  for	  semantic	  token-­‐hood	  in	  MI.	  For	  all	  its	  complexity,	  however,	   I	  wager	   that	   it	   is	  quite	  consistent,	  and	   that	  qualifying	   the	  token-­‐contextual	   account	   with	   these	   considerations	   greatly	   reinforces	   this	  promising	  approach.	  6	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